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1. Introduction
In economic analysis of legal contests, researchers often assume that access to court in-
tervention is equally costly for both parties and that the parties choose their legal e®ort levels
only once and simultaneously. In this paper my main objectives are to study the in°uence of
asymmetric litigation costs on litigants' legal investment incentives and the subsequent equilib-
rium of the `litigation game' and consider the dynamics of legal process. This is worthwhile,
because my model generates signi¯cantly di®erent e±ciency and distributional implications
than symmetric, static models. Moreover, when we are directly evaluating the performance of
legal institutions and making policy recommendations for litigation-system reform, it is use-
ful to proceed within a framework that is fully consistent with various asymmetry and timing
considerations.
Litigants often vary substantially in their litigation costs and parties with cost advantages
tend to come out ahead in litigation and adjudication.1 This idea is an old one, but it has
received renewed attention in the last three decades. Galanter's seminal work (1974) made a
compelling case for the proposition that the advantaged players, who are called the \haves",
tend to come out ahead in litigation. Galanter argues that the \haves" tend to win more often
because they are likely to enjoy superior material resources and have access to lawyers capable of
making superior arguments on their behalf. Superior resources enable the \haves" to purchase
the best available legal assistance and expert witnesses, that may improves the chances of victory
at trial. Second, Galanter contends, \repeated players," who tend to be \haves", will come out
ahead because they are usually more adept at conforming their claims to the requirements of
the law; hence less experienced individuals (\one-shotters") with grievances will be deterred
from initiating lawsuits against repeat players or contesting legal claims submitted by them. It
is this aspect of Galanter's theory that I will focus on, that is, on consequences of asymmetry
in the parties' adeptness at handling lawsuits.
The question of `how just is the justice system in the presence of asymmetry' is the most
important question I seek to answer in this paper. Drawing from Galanter's work, I study
the e®ect of asymmetry on the payo®s of advantaged players, the \haves", and disadvantaged
players, who are call the \have nots". I will be generating a game theoretical model of litigation
and give a quantitative impression on the e®ect of asymmetry. While no single paradigm can
fully capture the intricacies of litigation process, for the purpose of this paper three di®erent
litigation protocols come ready for use: static legal process, dynamic legal process with exoge-
nous sequencing and dynamic legal process with endogenous sequencing. The static protocol is
1For empirical evidence see, e.g. Wheeler et al. (1987), Eisenberg and Farber (1996) and Songer et al. (1999).
Wheeler et al. (1987) provide evidence from 5,904 U.S. supreme court cases from 1870 to 1970 that con¯rms
the hypothesis that ¯nancially and organizationally stronger parties tend to prevail in litigation against weak
parties, for di®erent types of cases, time period and types of legal representation. Using data on over 200,000 U.S.
federal civil litigations, Eisenberg and Farber (1996) show that the distribution of litigation costs for individuals
has more variation than the distribution of litigation costs for corporations. Lawsuits where the plainti® is an
individual and the defendant a corporation are found to have lower plainti® win rates. Songer et al. (1999)
provide evidence from U.S. courts of Appeals from 1925 to 1988 in support of the hypothesis that appellate
litigants with signi¯cant organizational strength are much more likely to win than less organized litigants who
are lack of litigation expertise and economies of scale.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 3
most often seen in the litigation literature. Although this is a good approximation in a variety
of legal contests with either no opportunity of exchanging information granted by procedural
requirement or signi¯cantly high costs associated with observing opponent's legal action, usu-
ally during a litigation, the development and presentation of evidence occurs sequentially in a
sequence of discovery process. Therefore, my contention has been that the dynamic litigation
protocol with multiple stages, in which the plainti® having the ¯rst move and both sides react
to each other's choices, is closer to the usual sequence of litigation process. In addition, I con-
tend that very often in legal disputes either party may put forward (or defend against) a claim
and precommit his/her e®ort. Examples of such litigation games include custody, divorce and
business contract disputes. It is my purpose in this paper to endogenise the decision to initiate
a lawsuit and study the equilibrium sequence of legal e®orts. Furthermore, and for the ¯rst
time in literature, I establish a measure of justice distortion for comparative static exercises:
I compare the degree of distortion of justice within a given litigation protocol across di®erent
magnitude of asymmetry; I also compare trial outcomes across di®erent protocols with the
same degree of asymmetry. To summarize my results, I ¯nd that when the parties are unevenly
matched, the plainti® wins more often and earns higher payo® in a dynamic legal process than
in static play. Further analysis suggests that in a dynamic process, a moderate degree of asym-
metry may work to improve access to justice. The theory also implies that in disputes such
as divorce, patent and contract, where either side can make or defend claims, the \have nots"
will initiate the litigation to challenge the \haves". The \haves" go along with this and scale
back expenditure. Endogenous sequencing minimizes litigation cost and may improve access to
justice. Its outcome Pareto-dominates static play outcome.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 represents the background of
the paper. Section 3 sets up the model and introduces the normative criteria. Section 4.1
analyzes static litigation game. Section 4.2 analyzes dynamic litigation game with exogenous
timing. Section 4.3 endogenizes the choice of timing. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
I contribute to the existing economic literature on litigation with endogenous legal expenses.
The ¯rst novelty of this paper is that I consider sequential legal contests with multiple stages.
There is a large literature on contest theory, originating from Tullock's seminal work (1980).
Tullock studies rent-seeking contest with symmetric players choosing their e®ort levels only
once and simultaneously. This game theoretical model has since served as the starting point
for numerous extensions, owing to its stylized feature and great simplicity.2 While the early
literature on litigations has predominantly studied such a static one-shot game,3 there is a
growing strand of this literature recognizing the sequential nature of litigation where one party
exerts e®orts after the other. Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) compares the e®ort levels of the
one-shot simultaneous play with those of two-stage sequential plays. They ¯nd that given the
(exogenous) opportunity to exert e®ort ¯rst, the advantaged player overcommits to his e®ort
2Nitzan (1994) provides a survey of this literature.
3See, e.g. Kobayoshi and Lott (1996) and Farmer and Pecorino (1999).J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 4
with respect to his one-shot simultaneous Nash equilibrium level while the disadvantaged under-
commits. These interesting results however rely critically on the assumption that litigants can
exert e®ort only once. While this is a good approximation in a variety of lawsuits with either
a large ¯xed cost of investing in litigation or a one-time opportunity of presenting one's case in
court granted by the particular legal procedure, in many other legal contests litigants can exert
e®ort multiple times.
This paper extends Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) and captures the four main elements
present in a litigation game. Firstly, litigants can exert e®ort in multiple periods before the
litigation ends. Secondly, they do so by observing their opponent's recent e®ort in an interme-
diate period; Thirdly, the probability of courtroom success depends on the cumulative e®ort
levels; Finally, litigants exert e®ort sequentially rather than simultaneously in each period. It
is the ¯rst element that distinguishes my study from that of Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001).
By focusing on the subgame perfect equilibria, I ¯nd that in an asymmetric litigation, there
are multiple equilibrium paths, all leading to the same legal outcome. Several empirically rel-
evant observations emerge from these equilibria. Firstly, distortion to justice and total e®ort
are typically greater (resp. lower) than that of static litigation model when the `have' (resp.
`have not') leads. Secondly, the °exibility of multiple actions neither bene¯ts nor harms the
litigants. Thirdly, in all equilibria where the `have' is the plainti®, all actions of the `have'
are necessarily taken in the ¯rst period only, while the `have not' defendant may allocate her
actions throughout all the periods; in all equilibria where the `have not' is the plainti®, both
parties may exert e®ort multiple times, but all leads to the same trial outcomes. This implies
that the Stackelberg outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium at which the litigation only
lasts for two rounds.
The second novelty of this paper is that I consider dynamic legal contests with endogenous
sequencing. In models of litigation with endogenous legal expenses, timing sequences are usually
speci¯ed exogenously.4 However, very often in a legal dispute, either party may initiate as the
plainti®. Examples abound. In a custody case, when both the mother and the father want
the custody of their children, both sides may put forward (or defend against) a claim. When
a divorce agreement cannot be reached between a spouse, both the husband and the wife
can initiate the lawsuit. When a contractual dispute has taken place between a big company
purchaser and a small business supplier, both sides may act as a claimant. It is my purpose in
this paper to provide a more general game, which includes several of these models as subgames,
and in which the timing of play can be in°uenced by the two parties. I then determine which
pattern of timing emerge as a consequence of equilibrium play. This is done by letting the
litigants choose both the timing of their moves and their e®ort level. In the announcement
stage of the game, the litigants simultaneously decide whether to invest early or late. If both
parties make the same timing decision, the game is played with simultaneous moves. If the
timing decisions of the parties di®er, the game is played sequentially. I ¯nd that in an unevenly
matched litigation contest, the Stackelberg outcome in which the `have not' (or disadvantaged
player or `underdog') leads will emerge as the only equilibrium outcome when the sequencing is
4See, e.g. Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1988), Hause (1989), Kobayashi
and Lott (1996), and Farmer and Pecorino (1999).J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 5
endogenous. The theory implies that endogenous sequencing protocol minimizes litigation cost
and may work to improve access to justice.
3. Model of Litigation
Consider two litigants, party 1 and party 2, who are involved in a civil dispute over the damage
award of value V, which has to be divided over two parties. V is common knowledge. An
example of this situation is a car accident in which two cars collide. The court has to decide
how much fault of each car-driver contributed to the accident. Assume that the \legally right
decision" will be the one that the court would accurately reach after extensive investigation of
the causes of the accident and the amount of damages. With knowledge on the genuine cause
of the accident and the amount of damage due, a legal decision would be available. I assume
that the parties in dispute are risk neutral.
3.1. Legal entitlement and Justice
Let µ1 (with 0 · µ1 · 1) (resp. µ2 (with 0 · µ2 · 1 and µ1 + µ2 = 1) ) denote party 1's (resp.
2's) (exogenous) legal entitlement to the disputed asset. µ1 = 0 indicates that party 1 is not
legally entitled to the asset; µ1 = µ2 = 0:5 indicates that 1 and 2 are each entitled to 50 percent
of the asset. I assume that µ1 and µ2 are common knowledge among the litigants but not known
by the court. Therefore the court's decision is subject to the in°uence of legal e®orts. I de¯ne
a litigation system as just if the system allocates a net payo® of µ1V (resp. µ2V ) to 1 (resp. 2)
in equilibrium. The 2-vector
µ = (µ1;µ2)
is called the right legal decision. For the purpose of the current study, it su±ces to simplify
the discussion and study a particular transparent case, where the two parties have equal legal
entitlement, i.e., µ1 = µ2 = 1
2. This normalization allows me to focus my attention on the sole
e®ect of asymmetry on parties' legal decisions and the subsequent litigation outcomes.
3.2. Solution concept
I require equilibrium of this model to be subgame perfect. The e®ort level of 1 (resp. 2) at
period t in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is denoted by ~ e
t
1 (resp. ~ e
t
2). The aggregate e®ort
level of 1 (resp. 2) in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is denoted by ~ E1 (resp. ~ E2).
3.2. Value of the case
For simplicity, assume the American rule is applicable, i.e., each party pays his own legal bills
regardless of the outcome. The value of the case5 to party 1 (resp. 2) given the e®ort of his
5Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) give axiomatic foundations for contest success functions having



















where E1 (resp. E2) denotes the aggregate legal e®ort expended by party 1 (resp. 2) on
presenting a convincing case. I assume the court is equally likely to recognize either party if
neither has presented quality evidence. This speci¯cation in equation (1) provides a simple
and tractable way of illustrating the di®erent e±ciency and distributional implications of the
asymmetric, dynamic model and the symmetric, static model. More general models will not
change my conclusion qualitatively.
3.3. Adeptness and Asymmetry
Let a (a ¸ 0) denote the degree of asymmetry in 1 and 2's adeptness or cost e±ciency in
conforming their claims to the requirements of the law. For example, a = 1 implies the parties
are equally adept with handling the case; a = 2 means that party 1 is twice as adept as
2. Using Galanter's (1974) terminology and without loss of generality, when the parties are
unevenly matched, I call the more adept party the \have" and the less adept party the \have
not". This parameter, which controls the magnitude of asymmetry, will play a central role in
my analysis.
3.4. Win rate








Note that there is a positive but diminishing marginal e®ect of each party's e®ort on his own
win rate,
w1 > 0; w11 < 0; w2 < 0; w22 > 0;
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and the arguments (E1;E2) are omitted for brevity.
These conditions also ensure that an increase in each party's e®ort level hurts the other, and
therefore makes it strategically desirable for each to precommit his/her e®ort level in such a
way as to induce a lower e®ort from the other in response. Whether this implies a commitment
at a higher or a lower level of ones' own e®ort depends on whether the other's best response
function is downward sloping or upward sloping.6
3.5. Measure of litigation intensity





6The general signi¯cance of the slopes of reaction functions has been extensively discussed by Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984), Bulow et al. (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 7
which is the total legal investment made by both parties discounted by the value of the stake
in dispute, i.e., the proportional resources dissipated in legal competition is r.
3.6. Measure of justice distortion7
Let 2-vector u = ( 1
V u1; 1
V u2) be the (normalized) trial outcome. The measure of justice
distortion ± in this paper is simply given by the Euclidean distance between the trial outcome
u and the right legal decision µ:
± := k u ¡ µ k :
Once we are equipped with the measure of justice distortion, we can put it to use in com-
parative static exercises. In the following section, I will examine the comparative statics of
equilibrium justice distortion with respect to the changes in magnitude of asymmetry for the
static litigation protocol, the dynamic protocol with exogenously determined sequencing and
the dynamic protocol with endogenous sequencing, respectively. I will also examine the com-
parative statics of equilibrium distortion with respect to the changes in the timing of litigation
process.
4. Analysis
4.1. Static Litigation Game
Typically, the static, simultaneous-decision protocol is adopted in litigation literature. Al-
though this is a good approximation in a variety of litigation with either no opportunity of
exchanging information granted by legal procedure requirement or signi¯cantly high costs asso-
ciated with observing opponent's legal actions, usually during the litigation, the development
and presentation of evidence occurs sequentially in a sequence of discovery process. Therefore,
my contention has been that the sequential decision protocol with multiple stages, in which the
plainti® having the ¯rst move and both sides react to each other's choices, is closer to the usual
sequence of litigation process. As a benchmark, though, this section ¯rst studies simultaneous
choices in a one-shot game.
The sequence of the game is, in period 1 party 1 chooses his legal e®ort level. In period 2,
without knowing 1's e®ort level, 2 makes her decision. Then the game ends. The unique Nash






where the superscript c stands for simultaneous, or \Cournot", decisions.








(a + 1)2; (3)
7See my companion paper for an extensive discussion on the properties of this measure along with other more
sophisticated measures of access to justice.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 8
which indicates that, a fraction of 2a
(a+1)2 of the total stakes is dissipated in the litigation process.
Figure 1 depicts the variations of equilibrium rate of rent dissipation as the degree of asym-
metry changes. The legal battle is most ¯erce (maxrc(a) = 1
2) when both sides are evenly




da > 0, for a < 1 and
dr
c(a)
da < 0 for a > 1). The intuition is straightforward:
facing too strong an opponent, the \have not" is pessimistic about her victory and subsequently
invests less than when she would if her strength was in close range with the \have". The \have"
exploits the \have not"'s pessimism by investing less as well. The total legal e®ort level falls.










rc@aD= 2 a €€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ €€€€
Ha + 1L2
Figure 1: Rent Dissipation (Static Litigation)
Note that the \have" and the \have not" are equally \aggressive" in pursuing trial victory
- irrespective of the asymmetry - they invest the same amount of legal e®orts to win the case.
This symmetric expenditure in rent-seeking games with \bias" has been discussed by Tullock
(1980).
Win rate and Trial payo® These legal expenses determine the weight of evidence, the win












(1 + a)2V and uc
2(a) =
1
(1 + a)2V: (5)
Obviously, asymmetry in°uences litigants' payo®s in equilibrium. When litigants are symmetric




4 ). When asymmetry is








2(1 + a)2 : (6)J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 9
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Figure 2: Win Rates (Static Litigation)
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Figure 3: Trial Payo®s (Static Litigation)
Figure 4 depicts the e®ect of asymmetry on distortion to justice in a simultaneous-move equi-




4 ¼ 0:35) when the parties are evenly matched (a = 1). Note that, in
equilibrium, the distortion can never be fully eliminated. This is because the parties necessarily
incur costs to receive their entitlements.
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Figure 4: Distortion to Justice (Static Litigation)
4.2. Dynamic Litigation Game { Exogenous Sequencing
In reality, we often observe that litigants expend e®ort in several periods to win a lawsuit.
They have the °exibility to add to their previous e®orts after observing their rival's most
recent e®ort in an intermediate stage. In this section, I study the strategic interactions and the
associated outcomes of such dynamic litigation process. The key questions in this section are:
(i) Will it be pro¯table for parties to commit?
(ii) In which way does asymmetry in°uence parties' commitment decisions?
(iii) How does asymmetry alter the parties' equilibrium payo®s when commitment has taken
place?
(iv) How does the °exibility of multiple actions alter the parties' litigation behavior and their
trial payo®s?J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 10
4.2.1. Two-stage litigation
I start with a simple case where the litigation takes place in two rounds. Without loss of
generality, let party 1 be the plainti® and 2 the defendant. The plainti® commits ¯rst to a level
of litigation e®ort E1 { after which it is observed and the defendant responds with E2. Later
on, I will extend my analysis to litigation games with multiple rounds.
With backward induction, let's ¯rst consider the decision of the defendant, who has the
opportunity to decide on her legal e®ort after observing the quality of the plainti®'s case. The











that is, the defendant only invests to prepare a counter claim if the plainti®'s e®ort level falls
below V
a .
Taking into account of the defendant's reaction pattern E2(E1), the plainti® would decide
on his observable legal e®orts after accessing the likely response of the defendant given E1. The




V ¡ E1 (8)







2 ¡ E1 if E1 · V
a
V ¡ E1 otherwise,
(9)
In analyzing the impact of asymmetry on the litigants' investment incentives, it will be
helpful to discuss separately two ranges for the parameter a: where 0 · a · 2 and where a > 2.







4V if 0 · a · 2
V
a if a ¸ 2:
(10)







4 V if 0 · a · 2
0 if a ¸ 2;
(11)
where the superscript P and D indicates \plainti®" and \defendant", respectively.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 11
Note that, when the parties are unevenly matched and the plainti® is the \have" (resp.
\have not"),8 he overcommits (resp. under-commits) to his e®ort with respect to his one-shot
simultaneous Nash equilibrium level (EP
1 > Ec
1 when a > 1 and EP
1 < Ec
1 when a < 1). Figure
5 develops the corresponding intuition using best response functions. In the neighborhood
of the one-shot simultaneous Nash equilibrium N, the \have nots" defendant's best response
function (BR2) is downward sloping. That is, when a > 1, in the neighborhood of the one-shot
simultaneous Nash equilibrium, we have
u21 =
aV (E2 ¡ aE1)
(aE1 + E2)3 < 0:9
Then party 1 (plainti®) has the incentive overcommit to a higher EP
1 as the Stackelberg leader,
curbing the incentive of his rival. Similarly, u21 > 0 when the \have" is a defendant (a < 1).10
In the neighborhood of N, his best response function (BR1) is upward sloping. Then the \have
nots" plainti® has the incentive to commit to a lower EP
1 as the Stackelberg leader. This soft-
ens competition. The \have" defendant goes along with this. This insight is important as it
demonstrates how unevenly matched litigants signi¯cantly di®er in their investment strategies

































when \have not" leads
.
Figure 5: Best response functions





(a+1)2V when a = 1. The reason for this
has been discussed in Warneryd (2000). As alluded to in the Introduction, Warneryd studies
a symmetric two-payer contest. He ¯nds that the unique pure-strategy equilibrium outcome
under simultaneous decisions coincides with the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
8This is often the situation when a litigation game is played between a ¯nance cooperation and an individual
debtor, between a condemnor and a property owner, between a tax agency and a tax payer, or between a pros-
ecutor and a criminal accused, where the former acts as a plainti®. Compared to the disadvantaged defendants,
these plainti®s usually have extensive experience in the type of cases they bring into court; over time, they have
developed expertise and have ready access to specialists. Therefore, they enjoy economy of scale and have lower
start-up cost for any lawsuit.
9Recall that in one-shot simultaneous Nash equilibrium, Ec
1 = Ec
2.
10This is usually the case when a litigation game is played between an auto dealer and a manufacturer, between
an injury victim and an insurance company, or between a bankrupt consumer and a creditor, where the former
takes the role of a claimant.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 12
of a two-stage game where one player's decision is observed by the other player. The intuition
is that when players are evenly matched (a = 1), the derivatives of both best response func-
tions vanish at the simultaneous-move equilibrium, which is a su±cient condition for timing of
decisions to be irrelevant. 1 cannot gain from precommitment, because the equilibrium under
simultaneous moves already occurs at 1's favorite point on 2's best response curve, where the
latter is tangential to 1's indi®erence curve.












4 if 0 · a · 2;
1
a if a ¸ 2;
(12)




a) of the stake is wasted in litigation when the plainti® is no more than (resp. at least)
twice as adept as the defendant.
Figure 6 depicts the relation between the equilibrium rate of dissipation and asymmetry.
In general, the total resources dissipated is negatively correlated with asymmetry. This result
is intuitive: deterred by her rival's advantage, the \have not" refrains from investing actively.
The \have" exploits his rival's passiveness by subsequently exerting less e®ort.
The most intensive litigation will exhaust more than half of the value in dispute (max rs(a) =
0:56). This takes place when a \have" plainti® makes an aggressive move to deter its opponent.
Refer to ¯gure 5, the marginal payo® of the \have not" defendant is decreasing with respect to
the plainti®'s e®ort level. Therefore, a \have" plainti® can curb the defendant's incentive by
overcommit to a higher level of e®ort and thereby gaining bigger victory in litigation. However,
when the di®erence on both sides is not signi¯cantly large, the \have not" defendant would
not be adequately deterred and would react aggressively. The result is a very intensive legal
combat.
















Figure 6: Rent Dissipation (Exogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process )
Figures 6 also illustrates the distinct in°uences of asymmetry on the intensity of legal invest-
ment as the dynamics of legal process di®er. When 1 < a < 2:41, the aggregate legal e®ort levelsJ. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 13
with exogenous sequencing is higher than that in simultaneous decisions (rc(a) < rs(a)). When
0 < a < 1 or a > 2:41, sequential decision gives rise to less intensive a litigation (rs(a) < rc(a)).
The results under the two protocols coincide when the parties are evenly matched (a = 1), or
when they are extremely asymmetric (a = 0 or a = 1).






3¡a if 0 · a · 2;
1 if a ¸ 2:





3¡a if 0 · a · 2;
0 if a ¸ 2:
(13)
Proposition 1 In a dynamic legal process with exogenous sequencing, a plainti® (resp. de-
fendant) wins more (resp. less) often.
Proof. Proposition 1 can be directly derived by comparing equations (4) and (13). k
Figure 7 depicts the e®ect. Further we have,




















4V if 0 · a · 2;
a¡1








4 V if 0 · a · 2;
0 if a ¸ 2:
(14)
Proposition 2 A plainti®'s trial payo® in the dynamic legal process (weakly) exceeds his
payo® in the static play. That is, uP
1 (a) ¸ uc
1(a) for all a, where the equality holds if and only
if a = 0 or a = 1 or a = 1.
Proposition 2 is immediate. Figures 8 shows the result graphically. The intuition is easily
conveyed. Consider the plainti®'s trial payo® in the two protocols. Refer to ¯gure 5, we
see that the Nash equilibrium N of the static protocol is the intersection of the two best
response functions. In a dynamic protocol, the plainti® chooses his most preferred point on
the defendant's best response function. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of the static play is
feasible for the plainti®. When the static play Nash equilibrium di®ers from that when theJ. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 14
















Figure 8: Plainti® Payo® (Exogenous Timing)















Figure 9: Defendant Payo® (Exogenous Timing)
plainti® has the ¯rst move, which is the case when parties are unevenly matched, the plainti®
does strictly better as a ¯rst mover.11 k
Proposition 3 A defendant's trial payo® in the dynamic legal process exceeds her payo® in
the static play if an only if she is a \have". That is, uD
2 (a) ¸ uc
2(a) for a ¸ 1 and uD
2 (a) · uc
2(a)
for a · 1 where the equality holds if and only if a = 0 or a = 1 or a = 1.
Proof. Proposition 3 can be derived by comparing equations (5) and (14). k
Corollary 1 The exogenous sequencing outcome Pareto-dominates the static play outcome if
and only if the defendant is a stronger player.
Proof. Corollary 1 is directly implied by propositions 2 and 3.






4[8 + 5a(a ¡ 4) + a(a ¡ 4)2]
1






2 if a ¸ 2:
(15)
Figures 10 depicts the in°uence of asymmetry on access to justice when timing is exogenous.
The distortion reaches its minimum when the plainti® is (approx.) 80 percent as adept as the
defendant rather than when both sides are evenly matched. The dynamics of legal process
may accentuate or diminish the e®ect of asymmetry in terms of access to justice. In general,
the degrees of distortion di®er under the two protocols. Interestingly, the ¯gure shows that
in a dynamic litigation protocol, a moderate degree of asymmetry may work to mitigate the
distortion of justice (±s(a) < ±c(a) when 0:43 < a < 1). The distortions converge when the
parties are evenly matched (a = 1) or extremely unevenly matched (a = 0 or a = 1), where
timing has absolutely no e®ect on the outcome of the game.
11A player in a game becomes a \¯rst mover" when he can commit to an e®ort level, that is, choose a e®ort
level irrevocably and reveal it to the opponent.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 15













Figure 10: Distortion to Justice (Exogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process)
4.2.2. Litigation with multiple stages
Now suppose the parties expend irreversible e®ort in 2T periods (where T is a natural num-
ber). Plainti® 1 (resp. Defendant 2) chooses his e®ort level in odd periods (resp. even periods).
I require equilibrium of this model to be subgame perfect. That is, starting from any point in
the game tree, the player to move selects the e®ort that maximizes his expected payo® given
the subsequent strategies of his opponent and himself. The aggregate e®ort level of 1 (resp. 2)
in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is denoted by ESP
1 (resp. ESP
2 ). I am ready to present
the ¯rst main result.
Theorem 1. For litigations of any ¯nite even stages, and the sequencing of move is ex-
ogenous, in subgame perfect equilibrium, the aggregate e®ort levels of the plainti® (party 1) and






In subgame perfect equilibrium, the \have" necessarily takes all action in the ¯rst period as
a plainti®; the \have not" can allocate her e®ort throughout all the periods as a plainti®. A
defendant, being either a \have" or a \have not", may distribute investment throughout all the
periods.
Proof. See Zhou (2006). k
Several insights emerge from Theorem 1. The °exibility of multiple actions neither bene¯ts
nor harms the litigants. In subgame perfect equilibrium, the \have" necessarily takes all action
in the ¯rst period as a plainti®, thereby curbing the \have not" defendant's incentive. This is
because a lower e®ort by a \have" plainti® in the ¯rst period would trigger a more aggressive
response by the defendant, which is unfavorable. In contrast, the \have not" can allocate her
e®ort throughout all the periods as a plainti® as for her there is no need to overcommit. A
defendant, being either a \have" or a \have not", may distribute investment throughout all the
periods because there is virtually no opportunity and therefore, no incentive for her to commit.
12EP
1 and ED
2 are given in equations (10) and (11).J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 16
This result implies that the Stackelberg outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium at which
both parties exert all their e®ort in the ¯rst two periods of their moves.
Before turning to endogenous sequencing litigation protocol, let us summarize the results
so far. We have seen that unevenly matched litigants signi¯cantly di®er in their investment
strategies when they can precommit their e®orts: the \have" plainti® will overcommit e®ort
compared with the Nash equilibrium in static play. An important implication of the \have"
overcommitting e®ort is that strategic behavior can lead to greater litigation cost and higher
distortion to justice. The opposite holds if the \have not" acts as the plainti® in litigation.
Moreover, Theorem 1 shows that unevenly matched litigants signi¯cantly di®er in their invest-
ment strategies when the litigation has multiple stages. The trial outcome, however, is invariant
to the number of litigation stages.
4.3. Dynamic Litigation Game { Endogenous sequencing
Now assume that, the legal procedure does not prescribe which party exerts e®ort ¯rst and
which party responds, that is, either party may initiate as the plainti® in a litigation. This is
often the case in legal disputes such as custody, divorce and contract:
(i) In custody litigation, who will put forward (or defend against) a claim if one partner has
superior ability to manipulate and intimidate the children regarding their statements to the
custody evaluator?
(ii) If a divorce agreement cannot be reached between a spouse, who will initiate the lawsuit
when gender bias in family courts works to the female's (or male's) advantage?
(iii) Legal costs are typically higher for foreign ¯rms in business contract disputes. They incur
higher costs in communications and in translating business documents into a form that will
be understood by a domestic court. Will the domestic ¯rm act as a claimant given its typical
advantage?
These questions will be answered in this section.
4.3.1. Equilibrium Sequence of Two-stage Litigation with Announcement
Now consider the extended litigation with announcement stage.13 Parties 1 and 2 ¯rst decide
and announce the rounds in which they will choose their e®ort levels. This is done simultane-
ously. The parties then choose their e®ort levels, knowing when the opponent does so, in the
rounds to which they were committed in the announcement stage. If both parties choose to
exert e®orts in the same rounds, a simultaneous play subgame occurs; if the litigants choose
to exert e®orts at di®erent rounds, then the party choosing to exert e®orts in odd (resp. even)
rounds becomes the plainti® (resp. defendant), giving rise to a sequential play subgame.
Same as before, I start with a simple case: the litigation takes place in two rounds after the
announcement stage. Our previous analysis reduces the problem in this section to the analysis
of the following normal form game in which parties decide simultaneously on their timing.
13Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Baik and Shorgen (1992) and Leininger (1993) endogenize the sequence of
moves in two-stage, two-player contests. Their models are similar to mine.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 17











I am now ready to state the second main result.
Theorem 2. In extended two-stage litigation with announcement stage, when the parties are
unevenly matched (a 6= 1), in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the \have not" emerges
as the plainti®; when the parties are evenly matched (a = 1) or extremely unevenly matched
(a = 0 or a = 1), there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria. The parties are indi®erent
between exerting e®ort ¯rst, second or simultaneously.







2. In this subgame, it is a dominant strategy14 for the \have not" party 1
to take the role of a plainti® and invest early and that the \have" party 2 is better o® observ-
ing then reacting to 1's action than competing for the ¯rst-mover-advantage.15 The unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is (Invest early, Invest late); Similarly when a > 1, the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is (Invest late, Invest early); When a = 1 or a = 0 or a = 1,
from propositions 3 and 4, we obtain uP
i = uc
i = uD
i for i = 1;2. Therefore, the parties are








4 if 0 · a · 1;
3a¡1
4a2 if a ¸ 1:
(16)
where E stands for endogenous sequencing decision.
Proposition 5 The litigation intensity in endogenous sequencing decision falls below that un-
der simultaneous decision. That is, rE(a) · rc(a) for all a. When and only when asymmetry
vanishes or become extremely severe, litigation intensities under both protocols converge. That
is, rE(a) = rc(a) = 0:5 when a = 1; rE(a) = rc(a) = 0 when a = 0 or a = 1.
Proof. This proposition can be derived by comparing equations (3) and (16). k
Figures 11 illustrates the e®ect of asymmetry on litigation cost.
14A strategy is called dominant if it always earns a higher payo® for the one uses it.
15The ¯rst-mover advantage states that a player who can become a ¯rst mover is not worse o® than in the
original game where the players move simultaneously.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 18












Figure 11: Rent dissipation (Endogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process)






3¡a if 0 · a · 1;
2a¡1
3a¡1 if a ¸ 1:





3¡a if 0 · a · 1;
a
3a¡1 if a ¸ 1:
(17)
Proposition 6 The \have" (resp. \have not") wins less (resp. more) often in a dynamic
protocol than in a static play. That is, wE(a) > wc(a) when 0 · a < 1 and wE(a) < wc(a)
when a > 1.
Proof. This proposition can be derived by comparing equations (4) and (17). k
When the sequence of moves is endogenously determined, the dynamics of legal process di-
minishes the e®ect of asymmetry in terms of win rates. Figure 12 illustrates the di®erence
between the two protocols.




















4V if 0 · a · 1;
(2a¡1)
2








4 V if 0 · a · 1;
1
4aV if a ¸ 1:
(18)J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 19

















Figure 13: 1's Trial Payo® (Endogenous Timing)














Figure 14: 2's Trial Payo® (Endogenous Timing)
Proposition 7 The endogenous sequencing outcome Pareto-dominates the static play out-
come. That is, uE
i ¸ uc
i for all a for i = 1;2.
Proof. This proposition can be directly derived by comparing equations (5) and (18). k






4[8 + 5a(a ¡ 4) + a(a ¡ 4)2]
1
2 if 0 · a · 1;
1




2 if a ¸ 1:
Figures 15 depicts the in°uence of asymmetry on access to justice when timing is endogenous.
The distortion reaches its minimum when one litigant is (approx.) 80 percent as adept as the
other. The ¯gure also illustrates the di®erent impacts that asymmetry would exert on justice
as the timing changes. Note that, ±E(a) < ±c(a) for some a. The enhanced access to justice
stems from the parties' °exibility in coordinating their legal actions to soften competition: the
\have not" would always has the ¯rst move and commit to a low e®ort level; the \have" goes
along and scales back expenditure. Both sides can therefore save a signi¯cant amount of e®ort
and avoid ¯erce litigation.












Figure 15: Distortion to Justice (Endogenous Sequencing vs. Static Process)J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 20
4.3.2. Equilibrium Sequence of Multiple-stage Litigation
Now suppose after the announcement stage, the parties expend irreversible e®ort in 2T rounds
(where T is a natural number).
Theorem 3. In extended litigation game of any ¯nite even stages, in subgame perfect equilib-






There exists a continuum of subgame equilibrium play path where the weak party initiates the
lawsuits and moves in odd rounds and the strong party moves in even rounds.
Proof. The proposition is implied by theorems 1 and 2.
Thus I can answer the questions raised in the beginning of this section: my model predicts
that in a dispute where the roles of the plainti® and the defendant are left to be determined
by the players themselves, the \have not" would bring the case to the court to sue the other.
The \have" goes along with this. When the parties are evenly matched, they are indi®erent
between investing early, late or simultaneously.
5. Conclusions
In a game theoretical model, the ¯ndings of this study rea±rm Galanter's thesis that the
\haves come out ahead." The parties with superior strength in litigation consistently fared
better than their weaker opponents and the disparity in success rates was greatest when the
disparity in strength was greatest. The total legal costs are always low toward the extremes
of disparity in strength (where a is close to 0 or 1) and highest for intermediate values of
disparity in strength. Distortions to access to justice are always high toward the extremes of
asymmetry and lowest for intermediate values of asymmetry.
Several notable additions of this analysis to the fairly extensive literature that has been
built on Galanter's insights are the discovery that
[1] in a dynamic litigation protocol where the roles of the plainti® and the defendant are
exogenously determined, the tendency of the \haves" to achieve greater trial victory and win
more frequently than their less advantaged opponents through aggressive litigation investment
is remarkably higher when he \haves" are plainti®s than when they defendants;
[2] while the dynamics of legal process always bene¯ts the plainti®, it hurts the defendant
when she is disadvantaged and the sequencing of move and countermove is exogenous;
[4] in lawsuits such as custody, patent and contract, where the roles of the plainti® and the
defendant are left to be determined by the parties themselves, the \have not" will initiate the
lawsuit to challenge the \have" as to soften litigation intensity. The \have" goes along with
this and scales back expenditure.J. Zhou Tilburg Law and Economics Center 21
[5] in both static legal process and dynamic process with endogenous sequencing, the extent
of rent dissipation is decreasing in the disparity in adeptness; however, in dynamic legal process
with exogenous sequencing, this is not necessarily the case.
[6] the outcome of endogenous sequencing litigation protocol Pareto dominates the outcome
of the static play;
[7] The °exibility of multiple actions neither bene¯ts nor harms the litigants.
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